

10-L-1242

CCR Denied in Full Documents
February 2014 Release

Component	Bates Number	Document Name	Exemptions	# of Pages
U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)				
	N/A	.VOB video file (TS)	(b)(1) Sec. 1.4 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (g) (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. § 130c	Run Time: 19:59
	000001-0000047	Power Point Presentation (TS)	(b)(1) Sec. 1.4 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (g) (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. § 130c	47

*****~~SECRET//NONE~~*****

Subject: NONE

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

CCR Gallagher/10-L-1242/SOCOM/000049

CCR Gallagher/10-L-1242/SOCOM/000050

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

~~SECRET/NONE~~ (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b)

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

CCR Gallagher/10-L-1242/SOCOM/000051

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

CCR Gallagher/10-L-1242/SOCOM/000053

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

BT

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

SECTION 3 OF 4

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

CCR Gallacher/10-L-1242/SOCOM/000054

7B. (S//NF) (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)
(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

8. (S//NF) (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)
(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

[Large redacted area]

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

8B. (S//NF) (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)
(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

8C. (S//NF) (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)
(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

9. (S//NF) (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)
(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

(b)(1), (b)(3), 10 USC § 130b, Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

10. (S//NF) (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e), Sec. 1.4(g)

COMMENTS: (Source Comments) 1. ~~(S//NF)~~ SOURCE A - (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b)

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e), Sec. 1.4(g)

PAGE 12 (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b) ~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

2. ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e), Sec. 1.4(g)

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e), Sec. 1.4(g)

3. ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1), (b)(3); 10 USC §130b, Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e), Sec. 1.4(g)

(Field Comments) 1. ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

PAGE 13 RUZDHTR0903 ~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b) (b)(3); 10 USC §130b, (b)(6)

OR BY TELEPHONE AT (b)(6)

2. (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

3. (U//~~FOUO~~) POC Information; QUESTIONS REGARDING THIS IIR SHOULD BE

(b)(3); 10 USC §130b, (b)(6)

4. (U) Source A is available for recontact. Source B is available for

CCR Gallagher/10-L-1242/SOCOM/000056

(b)(3); 10 USC §130

recontact.

COLL: (U) BG.

INSTR: (U) U.S. NO.

BT

#0903

NNNN

CCR Gallagher/10-L-1242/SOCOM/000057

Subject: (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

CCR Gallagher/10-L-1242/SOCOM/000058

CCR Gallagher/10-L-1242/SOCOM/000059

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

CCR Gallagher/10-L-1242/SOCOM/000060

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

SECRET//NONE // (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

CCR Gallagher/10-L-1242/SOCOM/000061

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

CCR Gallagher/10-L-1242/SOCOM/000062

CCR Gallagher/10-L-1242/SOCOM/000063

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

SERIAL: (U) IIR 5 114 0005 11.

COUNTRY: (U) Israel (ISR).

IPSP: (U) FMCC; IFC0056; IFC1137; IFC1237; IFC1240; IFC1247; IFC1287.

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

CCR Gallagher/10-L-1242/SOCOM/000064

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

DOI: (U) 20110629.

REQS: (U) DIAC1137027311; NTRI1287002810; UUSU1137001011.

SOURCE:
SOURCE A.

1. (U//FOUO) SOURCE IDENTIFIER -- //OTIS 5 111 0000 11//
2. (S//NF) SOURCE DESCRIPTION -- (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)
(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)
3. (S//NF) (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)
(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

SOURCE B.

1. (U//FOUO) SOURCE IDENTIFIER -- //SCI 5 111 0000 11//
2. (S//NF) SOURCE DESCRIPTION -- (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)
(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)
3. (S//NF) (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)
(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.
ENCLOSURES

TEXT: 1. (S//NF) (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)
(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

2. (U//NF) BACKGROUND. (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)
(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e), Sec. 1.4(g)

3. ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e), Sec. 1.4(g)

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e), Sec. 1.4(g)

PAGE 12 RUZDHTR0901 ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e), Sec. 1.4(g)

3A. ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e), Sec. 1.4(g)

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e), Sec. 1.4(g)

3B. ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e), Sec. 1.4(g)

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e), Sec. 1.4(g)

PAGE 13 (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

4. ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e), Sec. 1.4(g)

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e), Sec. 1.4(g)

4A. ~~(b)(1)~~ (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e), Sec. 1.4(g)

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e), Sec. 1.4(g)

BT
#0901

NNNN

ISRAEL SUE AFTER-ACTION REPORT

17 SEP 2010

From: (b)(3) 10 USC §130b, (b)(6)
To: Commanding Officer, SEAL Team FOUR
Subj: (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d) AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. (U) UNIT I.D.: Naval Special Warfare, SEAL Team FOUR

2. ~~(S)~~ EVENT NAME/NUMBER: (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c)

3. ~~(S)~~ LOCATION: (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c)

4. (U) DATES OF DEPLOYMENT: 28 July to 12 August 2010

5. (U) TYPE OF DEPLOYMENT: Small Unit Exchange

6. ~~(S)~~ BACKGROUND: (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

7. ~~(S)~~ TASK ORGANIZATION: (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

8. ~~(S)~~ OBJECTIVES:

- a. (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)
- b.
- c.
- d.
- e.
- f.
- g.
- h.

9. ~~(S)~~ DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT:

RECOVER

a. (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

b.

10. ~~(S)~~ SUMMARY OF DAILY EVENTS:

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

**11. ~~(S)~~ POINTS OF CONTACT:
HOST NATION**

(b)(1), (b)(3) 10 USC §130b, (b)(6), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

12. (S) WHAT THE COUNTRY, LEADERSHIP DESIRE OR NEED THE MOST:

(b)(1),(b)(3), 10 USC §130b (b)(6), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e), Sec. 1.4(g)

a.

b.

13. (S) POTENTIAL OF THE REGION, COUNTRY, GOVERNMENT, AND UNITS

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e), Sec. 1.4(g)

a.

b.

c.

14. (S) HOST NATION CAPABILITES

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

a.


b.

(b)(1),(b)(3): 10 USC §130b (b)(6), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e), Sec. 1.4(g)


c. (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e), Sec. 1.4(g)

d. (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e), Sec. 1.4(g)


(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e), Sec. 1.4(g)



e. (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)



f. (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e), Sec. 1.4(g)



(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e), Sec. 1.4(g)

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e), Sec. 1.4(g)

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

15. (U) ACTION ITEMS OUTSTANDING ISSUES AND QUESTIONS:

Issue: Gear/Weapons

(b)(3); 10 USC §130c (b)(3); 10 USC §130

16. ~~(S)~~ COMMANDER'S ASSESSMENT:

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e)

~~SECRET~~

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e), Sec. 1.4(g)

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e), Sec. 1.4(g)

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d), Sec. 1.4(e), Sec. 1.4(g)

Very Respectfully,

(b)(3); 10 USC §130b, (b)(6)

~~SECRET~~

CCR Gallagher/10-L-1242/SOCOM/000074

(b)(6)

Mr CIV USSOCOM NAVSOC

From: (b)(3):10 USC §130b, (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, June 02, 2010 6:07 AM
To: (b)(3):10 USC §130b, (b)(6)
Subject: Israel Tows Marmara Ship To Port, Shows Video of Passengers' Attack on IDF Troops

ALCON,

Link below is to a video of the boarding by Israeli Naval Forces of the cruise ship Mavi Marmara. The ship, along with 5 others was attempting to run through the Israeli blockade of Gaza. Analysis to follow on SIPR.

(b)(3):10 USC §130

v/r,

(b)(3):10 USC §130b, (b)(6)

Israel Tows Marmara Ship To Port, Shows Video of Passengers' Attack on IDF Troops

(b)(3):10 USC §130 Feature - Voice of Israel Network B 1500 GMT 31 May 10

[For a copy of the video, contact (b)(3):10 USC §130 or the OSC Customer Center at (b)(3):10 USC §130. Selected video also available at OpenSource.gov.]

Turkish cruise ship Mavi Marmara (freegaza.org)

The huge ship, Marmara, which this morning was the scene of the violent confrontation between IDF troops and the Gaza flotilla participants, is now entering Ashdod Port with over 500 foreign nationals on board. Earlier, three ships were towed to the port with approximately 100 people on board. About 80 of them were arrested and will be taken to Beersheba Prison. Fourteen will be deported from Israel via Ben-Gurion Airport.

Our correspondent Asad Pozaylov reports that the passengers in question are citizens of Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, European countries, the United States, and Australia.

Another soldier who was wounded in this morning's clash at sea has been

CCR Gallagher/10-L-1242/SOCOM/000075

taken to Haifa's Rambam Hospital. He is in light condition. This brings the number of wounded soldiers to six. One of the soldiers is in critical condition, two were moderately injured, one sustained light to moderate wounds, and the remaining two were lightly hurt. Thirty-four foreign nationals were also hurt in the incident. They are all in moderate to serious condition. The injured are mainly suffering from gunshot wounds, while the IDF soldiers also sustained blows from blunt instruments and stab wounds. This was reported by our correspondents Doron Shefer and Karmit Re'even.

A Turkish diplomat told Network B that Israel has not relayed any information regarding the identities of those killed in the flotilla clash. The source told our correspondent Eran Siquel that two representatives from the Turkish Embassy in Israel were visiting the hospitals and Ashdod Port. (passage omitted covered in previously-filed material)

Israel is distributing video clips documenting the harsh violence directed against the naval commandos. The Foreign Ministry has briefed the foreign diplomatic corps and explained the circumstances of the IDF operation. Deputy Foreign Minister Dani Ayalon told correspondents in the Knesset that it cannot be said with certainty that the international community is not convinced by Israel's position. Ayalon stressed that there were armed extremists on board the ship who did not hesitate to use their weapons.

Click for 1:00 min IDF spokesman video showing protestors attacking IDF soldiers on ship.

[Description of Source: Jerusalem Voice of Israel Network B in Hebrew -- State-funded radio, independent in content]

[This item was originally filed as (b)(3):10 USC §130

Attachments:

Click here (3.5 MB) to view (b)(3):10 USC §130

(b)(6)

From: The INTELST Forum <(b)(3):10 USC §130 > on behalf of (b)(3):10 USC §130b , (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, June 04, 2010 12:06 PM
To: (b)(3):10 USC §130
Subject: Re: Gaza Flotilla

Good history but it doesn't respond to two looming challenges to the Israelis- Hamas and Hezbollah- with Iran and Syria's aim to completely destroy Israel- and second the apparent intent of the blockade which is to make it more difficult to supply Hamas with armament- rockets for attacking "island " Israel. Perhaps working through economics and diplomacy with other Palestinian factions can nurture better relations with the Arabs- but I think Hamas and its allies would kill any "collaborators".

I do not think the Israelis have a good IO strategy- it seems awfully reactive. It does not contrast and compare what they are doing as opposed by the threat. They seem to take the right actions- but do not explain them well or place a clear enough context dissecting its opposition. It may be the media has taken sides with the loudest.

Another way to look at this is; OK, if Israel gave up the blockade would that improve the situation- would there be less likelihood of Hamas rocket attacks? Hamas and friends would change their objectives?

I may be wrong but things would only get worse - unless Israel judo flipped the momentum of what Hamas does after the blockade stopped so world opinion would shift to their perspective to take actions like another blockade to defend themselves.

It took about 20 years for Israel's opponents to accomplish this- the Israelis do not have this amount of time.

When Iran gets the big Boom - I expect Hez or Ham to do the proxy job. Two attacks- there may be enough left in Israel to react - but then a second attack from Iran to avenge the humiliation and carry out their religious duty.

yes, there may be sock hops in Tehran for the victory of the martyrs but where Israel and the Palestians were will be cherry red and glowing. It could happen so fast no one could say anything about it until it was done.

Another piece of history folks will be wondering about- like Darfur, south Sudan, Rwanda, and a list of others too long to include.

----- Original Message -----

From: (b)(6)
Date: Friday, June 4, 2010 19:04
Subject: Re: Gaza Flotilla
To: (b)(3):10 USC §130b

> (b)(6)
>
>

- >
- > You neglect any discussion of Israel's strategy, while positioning IO
- > as a mere raising/lowering of "spirits." IO has as its mission the
- > fostering of strategic victory, just as that is the mission of the air
- > force, infantry, etc. If IO is not aligned with strategy, it is mere
- > distraction and media amusement, not IO.
- >
- >
- >
- > The substantive question is what strategy is Israel following and does
- > its blockade of Gaza advance that strategy? The primary IO question is
- > how does Israel abandon in the IO space what the Israeli government
- > (but not all
- > Israeli) has already abandoned in practice - the notion of a Greater
- > Israeli quasi empire over all of Palestine? The Gaza blockade is a
- > half-hearted remnant of the abandoned "Greater Israel" strategy.
- > How the
- > blockade-breaking ships are physically interdicted is a low-level
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- > Let's review Israel's strategy as mostly external forces have
- > shaped it.
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- > Strategically, the nascent Israel was founded as a "community"
- > (Ottoman Turkish "millet") in which the Jewish "homeland" was just
- > that, land
- > ownership rather than national "sovereignty." The Ottomans and local
- > Palestinian leaders invited Jewish settlers into Palestine to
- > help develop
- > an impoverished and under-populated area of the Ottoman Empire.
- > The "Jewish"
- > strategy (and Zionism as an ideological institution generalizing and
- > validating this process) was to expand the domain of the Jewish
- > millet by
- > buying large, preferably contiguous plots of land, but at the same
- > time by
- > fostering substantial mutual economic relationships with the
- > various Arab
- > communities (themselves divided into various tribal or ethnic
- > subsets). Community-versus-community conflicts were suppressed or
- > at least moderated
- > by Ottoman forces. Had the Turks not picked the losing side in
- > World War I,
- > perhaps this arrangement would have perpetuated itself.
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- > In many ways, the British and after the British the United Nations

- > attempted to play the role of the Ottomans except that World War I
- > had unleashed
- > "nationalism." The long succession of disputes and various wars
- > between what
- > became the Jewish state and the Arab states culminated. In the
- > 1967 war in
- > which Israel swept the board and conquered portions of Jordan,
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- > Israel's conquests put it in the awkward position of becoming a junior
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- > militarily easy to occupy Israel's expanded domain. However, Arab
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- > Structurally, Israel could not assimilate "Greater Israel" as an
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- > population is itself
- > heavily divided among political parties, so adding millions of
- > Arab bloc
- > voters would either destroy a "Jewish" homeland state or at least
- > radically change its policies. The IDF is very much a "reservist"
- > military, but
- > similarly it could not assimilate subject peoples. Real-world
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- > the Soviet Union, which generated more than 1 million Jewish
- > immigrants into
- > Israel, so Israel's ability to assimilate the peoples of the West
- > Bank, Gaza, etc. were further limited, and in any case those people
- > did not want
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> From: The INTELST Forum
> [mailto:(b)(3):10 USC §130] On
> Behalf Of (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)
> Sent: Thursday, June 03, 2010 4:46 PM
> To: (b)(3):10 USC §130
> Subject: Re: Gaza Flotilla

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>
> The purpose of IO is to raise your sides' spirits, depress the
> enemies, and
> convince fence sitters to support you. In this conflict the two
> sides are
> pretty firmly entrenched and there are no fence-sitters. You are
> either (1)
> for Israeli survival or (2) you are not - fully knowing what HAMAS
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> charter).

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> That is it and that is where it is at. Period. Full stop. The end.

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> The message always will be the evil mean Jews are oppressing the poor
> helpless Palestinians. That is the only message that is going to
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> else. The fact that much of the press is silent about that fact
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> Thus the Israelis are going to have to send a very subtle message:
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- > gets booted
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- >
- > Therefore, in this situation it does not matter what they, the
- > IDF, say or
- > do, the narrative has already been written. As such, they have to
- > actually create a new playing field by denying their enemies the
- > advantage of the
- > current one, which is that the Israelis will be restrained and
- > will try to
- > subdue and not kill their adversaries to avoid bad press. Since the
- > Israelis cannot avoid bad press, they should just kill their
- > adversaries. The advantages to this are (1) less risk to Israeli
- > lives (2) fewer
- > adversaries*; (3) some may develop cold feet about playing this
- > guerrilla game (the Western fellow-travelers to the jihadis) if
- > they understand there
- > is a very good chance they will end up dead; and (4) a "new
- > normal" is
- > created because it is way past time to do so regarding HAMAS and
- > others; much as the U.S. did after 9/11. Before that it was always
- > only indictment,
- > extradition and trial. Now it also includes killing them. Even
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> v/r

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(b)(3):10 USC §130b ,(b)(6)

> Com: (b)(6)
>
> DSN:

(b)(3):10 USC §130b ,(b)(3):10 USC §130 ,(b)(6)

>

(b)(6)

From: Alert Black Sea <alert@rendon.com>
Sent: Wednesday, May 08, 2013 4:20 AM
To: (b)(3): 10 USC §130b, (b)(6)
Subject: Israel, Turkey to exchange ambassadors after talks

Israel, Turkey to exchange ambassadors after talks

Media: Xinhua (China)
Byline: N/A
Date: 08 May 2013

JERUSALEM, May 8 (Xinhua) -- Israel and Turkey would exchange ambassadors once the talks between both delegations over compensations and normalization of relations would end, a source in the foreign ministry told Xinhua on Wednesday.

The two countries' delegations, who met in Jerusalem on Monday and a week earlier in Ankara, reached a draft of an agreement, putting an end to the three-year rift between the countries.

"The talks were good and we are close to an agreement," the source told Xinhua. "There will be an exchange of ambassadors after that," he added.

He added that the agreement's draft is set to be authorized by both countries' parliaments before finalizing the deal.

There is still no knowledge of who will be the ambassador on Israel's behalf to Turkey.

The Prime Minister's Office said in a statement on Monday that the meetings between the parties were held in "good atmosphere" and that a final agreement is expected to be signed soon.

The rounds of talks focused on compensation Israel would pay the families of activists killed on the Mavi Marmara flotilla in May 2010.

The vessel, set out to break Israel's blockade on the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip enclave, was raided by Israeli commando soldiers. Nine Turkish peace activists were killed in the conflict.

The two countries halted cooperation on security, economic and tourism since 2010.

The Israeli delegation was led by National Security Advisor Ya'akov Amidror, and the Turkish side was led by Turkish Foreign Minister Undersecretary Feridun Sinirlioglu.

END

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(b)(6)

From: (b)(3):10 USC §130b ,(b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, September 28, 2010 7:26 AM
To: NSWG4 HQ DEPT HEADS (DG); NSWG4 HQ CPO (DG); NSWG4 HQ OFFICERS (DG)
Subject: Israeli Navy Intercepts Gaza-Bound Jewish Aid Ship

ALCON,

Yesterday Israel intercepted a boat carrying Jewish activists and aid to the Gaza strip. The event occurred without violence after the master of the boat did not respond to repeated hails from the IDF to halt. The boat was sponsored by the London-based Jews for Justice for Palestinians and other Jewish groups in Germany, Australia and the U.S. Its aim was to "challenge the continuing blockade of Gaza" and assert that "Israel's policies are not supported by all Jews," according to its website.

v/r,

(b)(3):10 USC §130b ,(b)(3):10 USC §130 ,(b)(6)

Israeli Navy Intercepts Gaza-Bound Jewish Aid Ship

By Jonathan Ferziger - Sep 28, 2010 8:25 AM ET Email Share

Israel intercepted a boat carrying Jewish activists and aid to the Gaza Strip, halting the vessel without violence four months after naval commandos killed nine Turks on an aid ship trying to breach its blockade of Gaza.

The U.K.-flagged ship Irene was stopped inside the 20-mile area of the Mediterranean Sea off Hamas-controlled Gaza that Israel has declared off-limits to international maritime traffic, Israeli army spokesman Barak Raz said. The boat is being taken to Israel's Ashdod port, he said.

"Prior to boarding the yacht, the Israeli naval ships transmitted two warnings," Raz said by telephone from Jerusalem. "These warnings were ignored by the captain of the yacht and its passengers, who sailed further into the area under naval blockade."

An Israeli commando operation on May 31, which violently stopped the Turkish aid ship and provoked international condemnation, is under investigation by Israel, Turkey and the United Nations. The pro-Palestinian Freedom Flotilla Coalition, which was behind the May ships, said in Athens yesterday that it is planning a second attempt to break the blockade. Five other ships that were part of that flotilla were stopped without violence.

Since the incident with the Turkish ship, two other boats have tried to

breach the blockade, include an Irish ship, the MV Rachel Corrie, that was intercepted without violence on June 5. A Libyan aid ship was persuaded to dock in the Egyptian port of El Arish July 14 after being promised its cargo of 2,000 tons of food and medicine would be transported to Gaza.

No Violence

Raz and the Irene's media coordinator in London, Yosh Kosminsky, said today no violence took place from either side during the takeover.

Israeli officials said yesterday they wouldn't allow the aid boat, which is carrying toys, textbooks and prosthetic limbs, to break Israel's maritime blockade against Gaza.

The boat was sponsored by the London-based Jews for Justice for Palestinians and other Jewish groups in Germany, Australia and the U.S. Its aim was to "challenge the continuing blockade of Gaza" and assert that "Israel's policies are not supported by all Jews," according to its website.

The UN Human Rights Council said in a Sept. 22 report Israel's assault on the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara constituted "grave violations of human rights law and international humanitarian law."

'One-sided'

Israel's Foreign Ministry, which refused to cooperate with the inquiry, called the report "biased and one-sided."

Israel says that on May 31 its soldiers were attacked with knives and clubs and seven were wounded, including by gunfire after people aboard the Mavi Marmara managed to grab Israeli firearms. Activists have said they threw the weapons into the sea and that the Israelis instigated the violence.

Israel says the blockade is legal because it is in "a state of armed conflict" with Hamas, which is considered a terrorist organization by the U.S., European Union and Israel. Hamas seized control of Gaza in 2007, ending a partnership government with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas's Fatah party.

Israel started a military operation in the Gaza Strip in December 2008 that it said was meant to stop the firing of rockets into its territory. More than 1,000 Palestinians and 13 Israelis were killed in the conflict. Since the end of the three-week operation, more than 400 rockets have been fired from Gaza into Israel, killing one foreign worker last March, the Israeli army said.

To contact the reporter on this story: Jonathan Ferziger in Tel Aviv at jferziger@bloomberg.net.

To contact the editor responsible for this story: Peter Hirschberg at phirschberg@bloomberg.net

(b)(6)

From: Alert Europe <alert@rendon.com>
Sent: Thursday, July 25, 2013 5:14 AM
To: Pybus, Sean A RADM USSOCOM NAVSOC
Subject: Turkey blames Israel for breakdown

Turkey blames Israel for breakdown

Media: United Press International (UPI)
Byline: N/A
Date: 25 July 2013

Turkey's deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc blames Israel for failing to reach agreement on compensation for Mavi Marmara victims.

Nine Turkish activists were killed in an Israeli commando raid in May 2010 on the ship, which was part of an attempt to break the blockade of Gaza.

Speaking to reporters earlier this week, Arinc, head of the Turkish team negotiating with an Israeli delegation, said the stall stems from Israel's insistence the compensation not be labeled restitution for a wrongful act, Hurriyet Daily News reported Thursday.

"In our first meeting [the Israelis] showed no opposition to this. But in the second meeting, they intended to give an ex gratia payment as a form of reparation because they fear compensation [as a result of their wrongful act] will set an example for other cases, which is not a concern to us," the paper quoted Arinc as saying.

He added that two other conditions Israel had earlier approved included lifting the blockade and acknowledging the loss of life on the Mavi Marmara, the Turkish daily said.

Israeli and Turkish delegates met three times in April and May.

The Israeli raid on the boat led to a total collapse in diplomatic ties between the two countries.

Israel said many of the activists aboard the ship were armed and the commandos were forced to defend themselves. Turkey's demands Israel apologize were ignored until March. At U.S. President Barack Obama's request, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu apologized to his Turkish counterpart in a telephone conversation, paving the way for meetings between the sides to discuss compensation and improve ties.

END

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alert@rendon.com

S: (b)(3)-10 USC §130b, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: Alert Europe <alert@rendon.com>
Sent: Tuesday, May 07, 2013 12:33 AM
To: (b)(3); 10 USC §130b, (b)(6)
Subject: UPDATE: Israel, Turkey draft accord on Gaza flotilla raid

UPDATE: Israel, Turkey draft accord on Gaza flotilla raid

Media: United Press International (UPI)
Byline: N/A
Date: 07 May 2013

Israel and Turkey reached a draft accord to mend a three-year diplomatic crisis stemming from a deadly Israeli raid on a Gaza-bound flotilla, officials said.

The draft agreement on compensation for the families of nine Turkish activists killed by Israeli commandos May 31, 2010, was reached during a Jerusalem meeting that brought the highest-level Turkish diplomatic mission to Israel since relations were frozen after the raid, officials said.

"The meeting was conducted in a good and positive manner," the office of Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu said.

"The delegations reached an agreed draft, but further clarifications are required on certain subjects," the office said, adding the two sides expected "to come to an agreement in the near future."

It offered no agreement details.

The Turkish delegation, led by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Feridun Sinirlioglu, a former Turkish ambassador to Israel, kept a low profile, saying in a brief statement an agreement was near.

Netanyahu was in China when Monday's meeting took place. Israeli national security adviser Yaakov Amidror and Joseph Ciechanover, appointed by Netanyahu in August 2010 to represent Israel, led the Israeli delegation.

The meeting lasted more than eight hours, officials said. It followed a daylong meeting between the two delegations in Ankara, Turkey, last month.

Turkey used to be Israel's closest ally in the region and its most important partner in the Muslim world.

But Ankara broke off relations after the Israeli commandos raided the Turkish ship MV Mavi Marmara in international waters of the Mediterranean Sea as the ship attempted to break Israel's naval blockade of the Gaza Strip.

All nine activist casualties were caused by gunshots, some of them at point-blank range or from behind, a 2011 U.N. report said. Many other people were injured in the raid.

The ship -- one of six in a "Gaza Freedom Flotilla" -- was carrying humanitarian aid and construction materials. Its crew had the stated intention of breaking blockade.

U.S. President Barack Obama brokered the Turkish-Israeli reconciliation when he visited Israel in March. He urged renewed cooperation between the two important U.S. allies as the Syrian war threatened to spill over and destabilize the broader region.

In a 30-minute phone call March 22, Netanyahu officially apologized to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan for operational mistakes that led to the deaths and promised compensation and a further easing of restrictions on Gaza.

Erdogan accepted the apology and both leaders agreed to enter into discussions on Israel's "non-liability" compensation to the families.

Once compensation terms are reached, Israel and Turkey are expected to normalize relations and send ambassadors to each other's nations, The Jerusalem Post said.

END

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(b)(6)

From:

The INTELST Forum

(b)(3):10 USC §130

on behalf of

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

@coltsnecksolutions.com>

Sent:

Friday, June 04, 2010 9:36 AM

To:

(b)(3):10 USC §130

Subject:

Re: Gaza Flotilla

(b)(3):10 USC §130b, (b)(6)

You neglect any discussion of Israel's strategy, while positioning IO as a mere raising/lowering of "spirits." IO has as its mission the fostering of strategic victory, just as that is the mission of the air force, infantry, etc. If IO is not aligned with strategy, it is mere distraction and media amusement, not IO.

The substantive question is what strategy is Israel following and does its blockade of Gaza advance that strategy? The primary IO question is how does Israel abandon in the IO space what the Israeli government (but not all Israelis) has already abandoned in practice -- the notion of a Greater Israel quasi empire over all of Palestine? The Gaza blockade is a half-hearted remnant of the abandoned "Greater Israel" strategy. How the blockade-breaking ships are physically interdicted is a low-level tactical matter, because the blockade itself is off-strategy.

Let's review Israel's strategy as mostly external forces have shaped it.

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million Jewish immigrants into Israel, so Israel's ability to assimilate the peoples of the West Bank, Gaza, etc. were further limited, and in any case those people did not want to be assimilated as second-class citizens of a Jewish state. Consequently, Israel has necessarily evolved away from its early strategy of being a coherent Jewish "community" interworking amicably with various coherent Arab communities and from being an "empire" ruling over its subject Arab neighbors.

The replacement strategy is that of being an "island" with comparatively little contact with or dependency on the Arab hinterlands. By comparison, the founders of the country of Singapore were enormously disappointed at being more or less "ejected" from Malaysia and having to become an island-state, but in fact Singapore has flourished. Israel has a similar opportunity. Ariel Sharon's unilateral withdrawal from occupation of Gaza as well as the building of the separation "wall" between Israel "proper" (more or less) and the Arab "mainland" is consistent with an island strategy. Unfortunately, Israeli residual occupation presence in the Arab "hinterlands" is an inherent "loser" proposition because it merely embroils the Israeli "island" in quasi-occupation of the Arab mainland. Rather than muddling strategies, Israel needs to make a clean break with "occupation" and its larger context, "empire" because neither appear to fit Israel's national strategy.

Although what I describe above may be in part or in whole incorrect, the fundamental challenge posed by the "Flotilla" is that of Israeli strategy, because it makes no sense for Israel to maintain a blockade if doing so is not consistent with strategy and instead merely an open wound consuming Israeli resources.

(b)(6)

Colts Neck Solutions LLC

From: The INTELST Forum (mailto: (b)(3):10 USC §130) **On Behalf Of** (b)(3):10 USC §130b, (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, June 03, 2010 4:46 PM
To: (b)(3):10 USC §130
Subject: Re: Gaza Flotilla

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You can then record everything and send out all of the footage and the press releases you want.

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w/r

(b)(3):10 USC §130b (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(3):10 USC §130

(b)(6)

From:

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)

Sent:

Tuesday, September 06, 2011 3:14 PM

To:

undisclosed-recipients

Subject:

ISRAEL Isolates Itself (Cohen/NYT) // Thanks to Unconditional US Backing (Karon/Time)

Israel Isolates Itself
By Roger Cohen
New York Times
September 5, 2011

LONDON - Here's what the United Nations report on Israel's raid last year on the Turkish-flagged Mavi Marmara had to say about the killing of a 19-year-old U.S. citizen on board:

"At least one of those killed, Furkan Dogan, was shot at extremely close range. Mr. Dogan sustained wounds to the face, back of the skull, back and left leg. That suggests he may already have been lying wounded when the fatal shot was delivered, as suggested by witness accounts to that effect."

The four-member panel, led by Sir Geoffrey Palmer, a former prime minister of New Zealand, appears with these words to raise the possibility of an execution or something close.

Dogan, born in upstate New York, was an aspiring doctor. Little interested in politics, he'd won a lottery to travel on the Gaza-bound vessel. The report says of him and the other eight people killed that, "No evidence has been provided to establish that any of the deceased were armed with lethal weapons."

I met Dogan's father, Ahmet, a professor at Erciyes University in Kayseri, last year in Ankara: His grief was as deep as his dismay at US evasiveness. It's hard to imagine any other circumstances in which the slaying in international waters, at point-blank range, of a US citizen by forces of a foreign power would prompt such a singular American silence.

Senior Turkish officials told me Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan had raised Dogan's fate with President Obama. But of course no US president, and certainly no first-term US president, would say what Prime Minister David Cameron of Britain said: "The Israeli attack on the Gaza flotilla was completely unacceptable." Even if there's an American citizen killed, raising such questions about Israel is a political no-no. So it goes in the taboo-littered cul-de-sac of US foreign policy toward Israel, a foreign policy that is in large measure a domestic policy.

The Palmer report, leaked to The New York Times last week, is a split-the-difference document, with the Israeli and Turkish members of the panel including notes of dissent. My rough translation of its conclusion would be this message to Israel: You had the right to do it but what you did was way over the top and just plain dumb.

It found that Israel's naval blockade of Gaza is legal and appropriate - "a legitimate security measure" - given Hamas' persistent firing of thousands of rockets from the territory into Israel; that the flotilla acted recklessly in trying to breach the blockade; that the motives of the flotilla's organizers raised serious questions; and that the Israeli commandos faced "organized and violent resistance."

But it also called the raid - 72 nautical miles from land - "too heavy a response too quickly." The flotilla, it says, was far from representing any immediate military threat to Israel. Clear prior warning should have been given. The decision to board "was excessive and unreasonable." It criticizes Israel for providing "no adequate explanation" for the nine deaths

or explaining "why force was used to the extent that it produced such high levels of injury." The panel is left dismayed by Israel's inability to give details on the killings. It calls Israel's policy on land access to Gaza "unsustainable."

Overall, the panel finds that Israel should issue "an appropriate statement of regret" and "make payment for the benefit of the deceased and injured victims and their families."

Yes, Israel, increasingly isolated, should do just that. An apology is the right course and the smart course. What's good for Egypt - an apology over lost lives - is good for Turkey, too.

Israel and Turkey have been talking for more than a year. Feridun Sinirlioglu, a senior Turkish foreign ministry official, has met with numerous Israeli officials. At times agreement has been close. Ehud Barak and Dan Meridor, Israel's defense and intelligence ministers, have argued the case for an apology; Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman has led the hawks saying Israel never bends; Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has had his finger to the wind. In the end, Lieberman and the far right have won, as they tend to with this abject Israeli government.

"It's a typical case where coalition considerations trumped strategic thinking, and that's the tragedy," Shlomo Avineri, an Israeli political scientist, told me. "Given the Palestinian issue at the UN, and relations with the new Egypt, we could use strategic wisdom."

That's right. Instead, locked in its siege mentality, led by the nose by Lieberman and his ilk - unable to grasp the change in the Middle East driven by the Arab demand for dignity and freedom, inflexible on expanding settlements, ignoring US prodding that it apologize - Israel is losing one of its best friends in the Muslim world, Turkey. The expulsion last week of the Israeli ambassador was a debacle foretold.

Israeli society, as it has shown through civic protest, deserves much better.

"We need not apologize," Netanyahu thundered Sunday - and repeated the phrase three times. He's opted for a needless road to an isolation that weakens Israel and undermines the strategic interests of its closest ally, the United States. Not that I expect Obama to raise his voice about this any more than he has over Dogan.

Turkey Crisis: Unconditional US Backing Has Helped Israel to Isolate Itself By Tony Karon Time Magazine Tuesday, September 6, 2011

Israel's fallout with long-time ally Turkey is no isolated spat that will be repaired any time soon; it's a dramatic illustration that no amount of US backing can prevent the growing international isolation resulting from Israel's handling of the Palestinian issue. Indeed, the unconditional nature of Washington's backing may, in fact, have become dysfunctional to Israel's diplomatic standing: A US domestic political climate in which challenging Israel on anything is about as wise as threatening to cut medicare payments leaves Washington unable to restrain the most right-wing government in Israeli history from its most self-destructive urges, while economic changes and the radical policies adopted by the United States in the decade since 9/11 have left Washington's influence in the Middle East at its weakest since World War II.

The trigger for Turkey expelling Israel's ambassador, cutting defense ties and vowing to wage a diplomatic campaign against the blockade of Gaza and in support of the Palestinian move for recognition of statehood at the United Nations was the Netanyahu government's refusal to apologize for the killing of nine Turkish citizens and a Turkish American in last year's raid on the Gaza flotilla. The Obama Administration had tried to broker a rapprochement involving some form of Israeli apology, which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had reportedly been inclined to accept but his ultranationalist foreign minister and key coalition partner (as well as rival) Avigdor Lieberman refused to countenance it.

The breakdown, however, is about a lot more than an apology: The flotilla itself, after all, had sailed in direct challenge to the Gaza blockade, with the support of the Turkish government - an expression of the fact that Ankara was no longer willing to follow its NATO allies, under US leadership, in turning a blind eye to the plight of the beleaguered Palestinians.

Israeli leaders and their most enthusiastic boosters in Washington like to paint this as a sign that Turkey had "gone over" to the region's Iranian-led "resistance" camp, but despite the ruling AK Party's roots in moderate political Islam and its insistence on a political solution to the nuclear standoff with Iran, Turkey is in fact a regional rival for influence with Tehran. Ankara's stance on the Palestinians, like its refusal to support or enable the Bush Administration's invasion of Iraq and its stance on the Iran nuclear issue or its break with the Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Assad, is based on its own reading of what's good for the region -- which is quite different from Washington's -- and on Turkish public opinion. And, as if to underscore the fact that its break with Israel doesn't threaten its commitment to NATO, Turkey announced last week that it had agreed to host radar installations for a NATO missile defense system targeting Iran.

Turkey's actions also reflect a growing international impatience with and loss of faith in Washington's handling of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel is worried, with good reason, that Egypt -- whose foreign policy has been made more responsive to public opinion by the overthrow of the Israel-friendly US-backed President Hosni Mubarak last February -- may follow the Turkish example.

And the fact that a Palestinian leadership that has essentially mortgaged its political fate to the US for the past two decades is now proceeding, over Washington's objections, to seek UN recognition of a state based on the 1967 borders -- and will likely win the backing of the overwhelming majority of member states -- is testimony to the collapse of a tacit acceptance by US allies since the Oslo Accords that the Israeli-Palestinian file would remain Washington's exclusive preserve.

President Barack Obama Administration's repeated humiliation at the hands of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu whenever he tried to put his foot down on over Israeli behavior so at odds with the international consensus that it threatened Israel's long-term standing graphically demonstrated to the Arab world, and even many Europeans, that the US was simply incapable of delivering on its promise of a fair deal for the Palestinians. Obama, for his part, has simply given up trying, and his Israeli-Palestinian efforts today appear to be restricted to trying to bully and entice the Palestinians into staying away from the UN and instead resume US-mediated talks with Israel. But the "peace process" to which all US allies were expected to defer is a butt-naked emperor, and Turkey's actions over the past week offer a sharp reminder that there aren't many left who're willing to ooh and aah over its couture.

It would be understatement to say that Israel has grown complacent behind the diplomatic shield provided by the US. Its political leadership has drifted steadily to the right and away from the international consensus on the terms of a two-state solution over the past decade, apparently heedless of the fact that its diplomatic gains in the years following the Oslo Accords were contingent on its intention to move towards that consensus.

The Bush Administration broke the mold, treating the Israeli-Palestinian issue first and foremost as a problem of terrorism, allowing it to put a political settlement to the conflict on the back burner -- or in formaldehyde, as Dov Weissglass, then an aide to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon put it. Israel could simply go through the motions of an occasional photo opportunity with President Mahmoud Abbas, and the White House would continue to mouth the catechisms of the Oslo era, and that would be that. The Arabs and Europeans were horrified, but with the US bull charging around the Middle East china shop, none was about to publicly challenge it.

In early 2007, in an op ed in the Israeli daily Haaretz, I warned that Israel was jeopardizing its own long-term position in the region by tying its own fate to that of the Bush Administration's reckless and misguided effort to remake the Middle East through military force -- efforts which, by then, were clearly failing:

"Betting Israel's security on the ability of the Bush crowd to transform the strategic landscape in the Middle East is rather like leaving a party in the backseat of an SUV whose driver is cradling a bottle of tequila and slurring his words as he rebuffs offers by more sober friends to take the wheel... America's overwhelming military advantages have failed to tip the region's political balance in its favor; on the contrary, resorting to military force over the past four years has actually been accompanied by a precipitous decline in America's ability to influence events in the region and beyond, much less impose its will."

Unconditional US support for Israel regardless of how its actions affected the prospects for peace with the Palestinians has, predictably, diminished those prospects. Why, after all, would Israel take the political risks required to settle with the Palestinians if maintaining the status quo has no downside? And the practice in recent years has been that the US will run diplomatic interference for Israel regardless of the circumstances, even vetoing UN Security Council resolutions that accord with Washington's own policy.

But the US ability to shield Israel from the consequences of its actions has dimmed with Washington's own declining influence over long-time allies. It will take something a lot more substantial than the umpteenth rerun of the rituals of a moribund peace process for Washington to reverse Israel's isolation, but the shift in Israel's domestic politics -- behind the US diplomatic shield -- over the past decade makes it less likely than ever that Israel will willingly agree to a two-state solution based on the international consensus. Perhaps ironically, though, the actions by Turkey and others could help any future US effort to press the Israelis towards a credible deal -- by allowing Washington to point to visible negative consequences for Israel in maintaining the status quo.

(b)(6)

From:

(b)(3): 10 USC §130b ,(b)(6)

Sent:

Friday, October 19, 2012 5:16 AM

To:

(b)(3): 10 USC §130b ,(b)(6)

Subject:

FW: NSW Lessons Learned

(b)(3): 10 USC §130b ,(b)(6)

Would you please forward this to the NSW lessons learned guru so that I can find out if he can be of assistance? Thanks much.

(b)(3): 10 USC §130b ,(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(3): 10 USC §130b ,(b)(6)

Sent: Friday, October 19, 2012 7:55 AM

To: (b)(3): 10 USC §130b ,(b)(6)

Subject: NSW Lessons Learned

Good morning Sir,

(b)(5)

Unfortunately, given the audience and venue, all discussion must stay unclass. Thank you in advance for any guidance you can provide.

Very respectfully,

(b)(3): 10 USC §130b ,(b)(6)

(b)(3): 10 USC §130b ,(b)(6)

Comm (b)(6)

DSN:

nJPR: (b)(3): 10 USC §130b ,(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(3):10 USC §130b ,(b)(6)
Sent: Friday, July 22, 2011 3:14 PM
To: (b)(3):10 USC §130b ,(b)(6)
Subject: FW: Dispatch: Israel Intercepts Ship Bound for Gaza

-----Original Message-----

From: Stratfor [mailto:noreply@stratfor.com]
Sent: Tuesday, July 19, 2011 3:46 PM
To: (b)(3):10 USC §130b ,(b)(6)
Subject: Dispatch: Israel Intercepts Ship Bound for Gaza

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<http://www.stratfor.com/?utm_source=General_Analysis&utm_campaign=none&utm_medium=email>

Dispatch: Israel Intercepts Ship Bound for Gaza
<<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110719-dispatch-israel-intercepts-ship-bound-gaza>>

July 19, 2011 | 2232 GMT

Click on image below to watch video:

<<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110719-dispatch-israel-intercepts-ship-bound-gaza>>

Though a recent interception and boarding of a French-flagged yacht bound for Gaza occurred without incident, military analyst Nate Hughes says Israel's relationships with regimes around the region remain troubled by the so-called 'Arab Spring' and the potential for a resurgence of pro-Palestinian sentiment.

Editors Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete accuracy.

A single ship associated with the so-called second flotilla bound for Gaza was intercepted and boarded by the Israeli navy, but what's important about this is not this minor incident - the Israelis regularly intercept ships attempting to breach the blockade into Gaza - but that so far, the incident has failed to achieve any sort of notoriety that was found in 2010 with the Mavi Marmara flotilla.

In this most recent incident, the Israeli navy first intercepted and then boarded a French-flagged yacht attempting to breach the blockade and make a

run to Gaza. This is the only ship of the larger flotilla that has been able to leave Greek port. The rest are bound up there for varied administrative and bureaucratic reasons, deliberately so, but have been unable to leave port.

Tactically, this is a much more manageable problem. The problem for the Israelis in 2010, with the big flotilla incident, was that the Mavi Marmara was a large ferry, overloaded and carrying over 1,000 people and there were a number of ships in company with it that the Israelis had to manage, essentially all at once. In that incidence, the Israelis attempted to board and scuffles with the passengers led to a number of injuries among the Israeli commandos and ultimately resulted in nine dead Turkish citizens. That incident sparked an enormous political backlash against the Israelis. The Israelis learned a great deal from that raid and were certainly prepared at this point to deal with whatever the flotilla activists attempted to push through the blockade, but they have obviously made great strides in preventing the flotilla from forming in the first place.

But the important thing about the current time is the context of the so-called Arab Spring. Where as in 2010 the Israelis were in a very strong position. The Arab Spring has changed the context a little bit. Israel has sort of gotten to the point where it was taking for granted its relationship with, for example, the Mubarak regime in Egypt. While that regime is still in place, minus Mubarak, the problem is that Cairo is walking a much finer line with its own people than it has been in the past and it is very focused on containing the unrest. What this means is that if the unrest in Egypt and in the wider region were to take on, not just the current Democratic and disaffected nature, but took on a more pro-Palestinian, anti-Israeli line, that would put a number of regimes in the region upon which Israel relies for, if not overt, at least covert and clandestine coordination assistance, in a much more difficult place and could make Israel's immediate neighborhood a lot more difficult to manage.

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(b)(6)

From:

(b)(3):10 USC §130b ,(b)(6)

Sent:

Monday, October 22, 2012 5:04 AM

To:

(b)(3):10 USC §130b ,(b)(6)

Subject:

RE: NSW Lessons Learned

Keith - Sorry for the double tap, but I have not heard from the LL POC.

Would you please ask him to contact me again? Thanks (b)(3):10 USC §130b ,(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(3):10 USC §130b ,(b)(6)

Sent: Friday, October 19, 2012 8:26 AM

To: (b)(3):10 USC §130b ,(b)(6)

Subject: Re: NSW Lessons Learned

(b)(3):10 USC §130b ,(b)(6) will do.

VR,

(b)(3):10 USC §130b ,(b)(6)

----- Original Message -----

From: (b)(3):10 USC §130b ,(b)(6)

Sent: Friday, October 19, 2012 05:16 AM

To: (b)(3):10 USC §130b ,(b)(6)

Subject: FW: NSW Lessons Learned

(b)(3):10 USC §130b ,(b)(6) - Would you please forward this to the NSW lessons learned guru so that I can find out if he can be of assistance? Thanks much. Vr, (b)(3):10 USC §130b ,(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(3):10 USC §130b ,(b)(6)

Sent: Friday, October 19, 2012 7:55 AM

To: (b)(3):10 USC §130b ,(b)(6)

Subject: NSW Lessons Learned

Good morning Sir,

(b)(6)

Unfortunately, given the audience and venue, all discussion must stay unclass. Thank you in advance for any guidance you can provide.

Very respectfully,

(b)(3):10 USC §130b ,(b)(6)

(b)(3):10 USC §130b ,(b)(6)

Com: (b)(6)

DSN:

nIP: (b)(3):10 USC §130b ,(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From:

The INTELST Forum <

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(3):10 USC §130 ,(b)(6)

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)

Sent:

Thursday, June 03, 2010 1:46 PM

To:

(b)(3):10 USC §130

Subject:

Re: Gaza Flotilla

The purpose of IO is to raise your sides' spirits, depress the enemies, and convince fence sitters to support you. In this conflict the two sides are pretty firmly entrenched and there are no fence-sitters. You are either (1) for Israeli survival or (2) you are not – fully knowing what HAMAS and crew intend to do to every Jew they can get (if you are not sure read their charter).

That is it and that is where it is at. Period. Full stop. The end.

The message always will be the evil mean Jews are oppressing the poor helpless Palestinians. That is the only message that is going to be allowed out by the world press. That the "Palestinians" have endured over 60 years of inept and corrupt leadership says more about them than anything else. The fact that much of the press is silent about that fact also speaks volumes. Again, not all anti-Semites are "Nazis" – most today are self-described "progressives". (Although how anti-Semitism is "progressive" I am not sure.)

Thus the Israelis are going to have to send a very subtle message: the next ship that refuses to stop when trying to break the blockade gets sunk; the next boarding party goes fully armed and the first guy who raises a hand gets shot; the next NGO found supporting armed attacks on Israel gets booted out of the area. Or spends some time in prison.

Therefore, in this situation it does not matter what they, the IDF, say or do, the narrative has already been written. As such, they have to actually create a new playing field by denying their enemies the advantage of the current one, which is that the Israelis will be restrained and will try to subdue and not kill their adversaries to avoid bad press. Since the Israelis cannot avoid bad press, they should just kill their adversaries. The advantages to this are (1) less risk to Israeli lives (2) fewer adversaries*; (3) some may develop cold feet about playing this guerrilla game (the Western fellow-travelers to the jihadis) if they understand there is a very good chance they will end up dead; and (4) a "new normal" is created because it is way past time to do so regarding HAMAS and others; much as the U.S. did after 9/11. Before that it was always only indictment, extradition and trial. Now it also includes killing them. Even by "drone".

You can then record everything and send out all of the footage and the press releases you want.

Now what does one think would happen if a Greek flotilla tried to land on the Turkish occupied side of Cyprus?

*I have never been convinced that "if you kill them you will only make more of them." Because killing does work otherwise I all of the theories of warfare are then bunk (such as killing your enemy being a main point). Israel is not fighting COIN, they know who their enemies are for they are vocal about expressing it. There is little to be gained by being nice to those who want to cut your head off. The warnings have been given, if one chooses to ignore them they do so at their own peril. Much like the basic instructions of an armed guard - if one wants to press their luck than do so, but don't say the "ghastly man shot me for no reason" when you tried to enter a restricted area.

v/r

(b)(3):10 USC §130b ,(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(3):10 USC §130b ,(b)(3):10 USC §130 ,(b)(6)